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Knowing how to send and interpret signals is an essential part of both 
diplomacy and war. Political scientists have recognized that costly signals—
gestures and actions that involve significant cost or risk—are central to politics 
and diplomacy since modeling doyen James Fearon built his Ph. D. thesis 
around the concept in the 1990s. Because these signaling systems are pervasive 
in nature (many of these strategies arise independently and repeatedly to solve 
common problems suggesting evolutionary pressure to select strategies 
offering the most success at the least cost), their underlying strategic logic has 
important implications to foreign policy challenges we face today. By 
capitalizing on solutions derived by evolution over 3. 5 billion years of life on 
Earth, we may identify ideas that otherwise might not have been explored in a 
policy context potentially offering quick, novel, and effective options to 
increase strategic and combat effectiveness. Here we present 8 lessons from 
evolution for political science.  
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Lesson 1. Honest signals will be costly 
The power of costly signaling in the animal world is captured in the famous 
example of the peacock’s tail. A series of studies have demonstrated that 
females select males with the longest and most elaborate tails. The benefits of 
such a selection criterion are clear: males that are able to allocate sufficient 
resources to grow this long tail, make it colorful, and keep it clean and healthy 
looking, survive despite their handicap. Males that can do this have energy to 
burn; they radiate their quality. The tail is thus an honest advertisement of the 
skills of acquiring food, avoiding predators, and controlling parasites and 
pathogens. Females choosing these showy males will ensure high quality genes 
being transmitted to their offspring 
 Indeed, from this and many other studies of signaling and communication 
in a diversity of mammals, birds, fishes, and insects, we can conclude that a 
common feature of animal communication is that costly signaling is valued by 
receivers, not just the sender, and in a wide range of settings. This biological 
rule has important implications for several aspects of foreign policy including 
making positive gestures during negotiations.  
 An effective negotiator must communicate honesty to the receiver, thereby 
inducing trust. Negotiations proceed with repeated positive feedback: the 
receiver needs to honestly signal trust back to the negotiator. Complicating this 
interaction is the cross-cultural nature of diplomacy that may result in the 
misinterpretation of honest signals. Positive gestures are one way of building 
trust. To be effective in the long term, positive gestures must be costly, yet 
many positive gestures in foreign policy are ritualized into protocol whereby 
there are formal and invariant rules by which states, and their emissaries, 
interact. If they are expected as routine, they are unlikely to be valued—seen as 
a result of the situation rather than any cooperative disposition of the actor.  
 
Lesson 2: Ritualized signals may have little value, but may be used 
strategically 
In animal systems, ritualized signals contain little information and do not vary 
much from individual to individual; consider the first, stereotypical behaviors 
in a courtship sequence. To avoid confusion, such displays are often ritualized. 
This lack of variation means that there is less of an opportunity for a receiver 
to associate a display with its underlying cost. And, while ritualized gestures 
might be commonplace ways of building trust—consider shaking hands, 
smiling, engaging in small talk—these displays may not be as effective as a 
genuinely costly display. This is not to entirely discount the importance of 
these displays, because effective cooperation between individuals is costly in 
that it takes time to develop and requires individuals to evaluate each other’s 
reputations that are built over time. However, for now, let’s consider isolated 
responses.  
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 Systematically reducing the value of a signal to a receiver may be used 
strategically. The Egyptians capitalized on what became to Israelis a ritualized 
signal—maneuvers on the Israeli border in the months preceding the Yom 
Kippur War. Before attacking Israel, Egypt ran 40 military exercises on Israel’s 
borders. This led Israel to discount the threat of a troop buildup on their 
border and enhanced its vulnerability.  
 However, there are also costs to ritualization. The recently scrapped 
Homeland Security Threat Level remained unchanged for years before being 
eliminated. What message did this invariant ritualized message send to 
travelers—or to prospective terrorists? Indeed, one lesson from nature is that 
one must consider the nature of the recipient in order to properly design a 
signal. And, in some cases, such ritualized signals may become meaningless 
and counterproductive.  
 
Lesson 3: Unexpected signals may be more effective 
Following a natural disaster, nations offer assistance to other countries. An 
offer of one million dollars in aid from a poor country is a much more 
meaningful contribution than the same offer from a wealthy one. And, 
individual citizens lining up to spontaneously help others (as often occurs 
following natural disasters) are truly meaningful gestures. For instance, 
following devastating 1999 and 2011 earthquakes in Turkey, members of the 
Israeli public spontaneously and immediately organized to collect food, 
clothing and other emergency necessities for Turkish citizens. While many 
governments formally responded, including the Israeli government, such 
responses are difficult to interpret since they are routine and likely to be 
strategically motivated. The spontaneity of the Israeli public response however 
appeared to be a sincere offer of help. The key insight is that it is not the 
absolute value, but rather the value relative to ability, and the sincerity of the 
donation that is likely to define a trustworthy display. Humans suffer from the 
so-called ‘correspondence bias’, which makes us more likely to assume the 
behavior of other actors is a result of their fundamental character, whereas our 
own behavior is a result of reacting to the situation—especially if the act 
impacts on us negatively. However, when the act impacts on us positively, we 
are more likely to assume the actor was motivated by situational constraints.  
 
Lesson 4: Threats should be costly 
Conversely, natural systems show us that negative gestures such as threats 
may also have to be costly to be effective. A striking lesson from evolution is 
that adversaries should organize their threats into a gradually escalating 
sequence, resorting to all-out fighting only if the less costly, earlier signals fail 
to induce their opponent to back down. Red deer competing for mates strut 
threateningly side-by-side, then bellow at each other, and only then lock 
antlers if one individual does not back away. The logic is impeccable: if the 
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adversaries are badly mismatched, they will realize it during the first phase 
and back down quickly, saving both from wasting further time and energy. If 
the payoff for winning is not great, individuals should not escalate. But, if the 
payoff is great, more subtle differences will be detected at the second stage, 
again a mutually beneficial outcome. Truly dangerous fights will only occur 
when both have proved themselves to be so evenly matched that signaling 
alone cannot distinguish between them. Over millions of years, natural 
selection has crafted a finely-tuned ‘playbook’ of signaling and escalation for 
species’ to work from as they attempt to resolve their conflicts of interest 
without getting killed in the process.  
 Humans face similar problems, and bargaining theories of war have 
investigated similar problems of incremental signals. However, evolution 
offers a useful new perspective on this because we face types of conflict that 
our ancestors never encountered, and thus to which our responses have not 
been molded by selection. In a world of cyber-warfare, weapons that kill at a 
distance, and remote command and control far from the battlefield, our 
evolved signaling mechanisms neither convey messages to the enemy nor bring 
us direct feedback (e.g., drone pilots fight thousands of miles from the 
battlefield, the sources of computer worms like Stuxnet are opaque and 
difficult to trace). This means we may expect an evolutionary ‘mismatch’ 
between our behavior and our environment and may lead to unintended and 
un-checked escalation. Rival states may exchange costly signals prior to 
launching into war, for example military parades that display cutting edge 
technology, power projection through naval port calls, elevating level of alert 
status for forces as well as funding levels for security and defensive activities. 
However, different strategies and their deployment between adversaries in a 
crisis may lead to confusion and potentially catastrophic outcomes. 
Considering the stakes in incidents such as the nuclear alerts ordered by 
President Kennedy in the Cuban Missile Crisis, by Nixon during the Yom 
Kippur War of 1973, or North Korea’s response to accusations that it torpedoed 
and sank a South Korean warship in March 2010—the question becomes a very 
urgent one.  
 Evolutionary thinking provides guidelines for formulating an appropriate 
policy response, particularly when it is unclear whether adversaries are 
following the same rules. Just as in conflicts in natural systems, honest 
signaling of intention in a series of reciprocal steps is the best way to obtain a 
peaceful resolution. And, developing a reputation for honest signaling is a 
powerful force in obtaining trust. In the absence of a reputation for honest 
signaling, it is difficult to know whether to escalate up or down in negotiations.  
 
Lesson 5: State apologies should be costly 
To be successful apologies must be costly. The cost of an apology is the political 
risk to the person or administration apologizing, and broader costs to pride 
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and well-being within an apologizing society. This may explain why 
meaningful apologies are not very common, and most apologies happen long 
after the incident that stimulated it. Apologizing, after all, is a political 
calculation. Waiting until there is no political cost because opponents have 
died or moved on to some other issue lessens the value of an apology. In 1998, 
President Clinton apologized for his administration’s inaction during the 
Rwandan genocide four years earlier—an unusual and costly act for a President 
still in office. Israel and Germany have good diplomatic relations and there is 
also friendship among the populations (many Germans travel to Israel) and 
this is remarkable given the devastation in the living memory of so many Jews 
and Israelis. At least three factors were probably important: 1) public apologies 
which were followed up by real costs such as 2) reparation payments, and 3) a 
schooling system that makes German children more educated about the 
Holocaust than probably any other children outside Israel in the world. Nelson 
Mandela probably recognized the huge value of costly apologies when he set up 
the reconciliation commissions in South Africa after the fall of the apartheid. 
Rather than sending all whites involved in the apartheid state to jail, he 
created a forum for them to apologize face to face with their victims and wipe 
the slate clean.  
 Insincere apologies may be particularly costly. Then Secretary of Defense 
Donald Rumsfeld’s apology about the Abu Ghraib prisoner abuse backfired 
when he tried to also explain that there was Arab mis-understanding of 
American culture which could not condone such behavior. This apology was 
widely regarded as a flop. Japan’s apologies for atrocities in China during 
World War II remain unvalued by the Chinese because of Japanese dignitaries’ 
visiting the Yasukuni Shrine to Japanese war dead, which includes the remains 
of convicted war criminals.  
 
Lesson 6: Humans (and animals) are not necessarily rational: symbolic 
concessions may be useful 
Studies of animals (and humans) also show us that in certain circumstances, 
individuals do not make economically rational decisions. There is healthy 
debate about whether these are indeed costly mistakes or evolved strategies. 
However, there are some lessons from this observation for security and policy.  
 One of these is that low cost actions may sometimes have a high value to 
recipients of these actions and, as Jeremy Ginges and colleagues found, the 
economically rational offers are not necessarily what people will accept. 
Indeed, people’s core values must be recognized, often by symbolic 
concessions. In their research asking both Palestinians and Israelis about what 
sort of incentives might help move a peace process forward, they found that 
financial incentives were viewed very negatively, but symbolic concessions, 
such as apologies for past actions and removing anti-Semitic material from 
textbooks, went far both with leaders and citizens. Indeed, offers of reparation 
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without the necessary symbolic concessions were viewed negatively. Here 
again, Nelson Mandela recognized the importance of symbolic concessions 
when he publicly supported the Springbok rugby team, even though, initially, 
his black supporters wanted to disband this symbol of apartheid. 
Understanding that economically irrational behavior is common and that 
symbolic concessions have great value may be essential in negotiating through 
seemingly intractable political quagmires (e.g., such as those in North Korea, 
Iran, and, as Atran and Ginges write—Israel/Palestine).  
 
Lesson 7: Weaker parties will advertise the strength of their conviction 
Obviously not all diplomatic interactions and conflicts are between state 
actors. Are there unique insights for interactions with non-state actors? A 
characteristic of a state interacting with a non-state actor is power asymmetry.  
Consider the rapid spread of suicide terrorism among weak and 
disenfranchised organizations fighting a stronger state. With the exception of 
Kamikaze pilots in WWII, we have not seen two strong opponents in the 20th 
century use suicide attacks as a military strategy. Indeed, one could argue that 
the Japanese only resorted to Kamikaze pilots once they realized they were 
losing because of a loss of pilots, fuel, and weapons. One interpretation of this 
is that being able to marshal legions of self-sacrificial volunteers creates an 
honest indicator of the amount of displeasure and the intention to continue 
fighting that the weaker party faces. When non-state actors fight against 
democratic state actors, the public opinion is as much a target as the military 
and the weaker party often wins by turning public opinion against ongoing 
conflict. Thus, in such asymmetrical combat, such as Chechens against the 
Russians, Hamas against Israel, or the LTTE against the Sri Lankan 
government, we should expect the weaker party to work hard to impress upon 
the stronger party the strength of their conviction. Suicide terrorism may be 
such a potent signal because it is an unbluffable signal of commitment.  
 Political scientists have recently recognized this, and have characterized 
five distinct ways in which terrorists use costly signals to advance their agenda: 
attrition (wearing down the enemy), intimidation (of opponents in their own 
population), provocation (of the enemy to violence and collateral damage that 
consolidates resistance against it), spoiling (of a peace process), and 
outbidding (of domestic rival parties). Moreover, natural systems show us that 
self-sacrifice is often associated with high relatedness. Social insect workers 
will die to help their highly-related group persist and the same logic might 
explain situations in which tightly knit groups, bound by kinship and religion, 
are willing to make the ultimate sacrifice. Holding this lens over the problem of 
terrorism clarifies the strategic logic that should guide a policy response.  
 
Lesson 8: Signals are often species specific: it’s essential to know your 
audience 
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Species differ in their signals that are often directed to conspecifics. Indeed, 
divergent communication signals are used to ‘isolate’ species from each other 
and prevent costly, but mis-guided fights, and potentially wasteful 
reproductive attempts with the wrong species. The final insight comes from the 
widespread evolution of species-specific signals: it’s essential to know your 
audience in order to communicate effectively to it and the same signal may 
mean very different things to different audiences.  
 Consider how two populations may have difficulties communicating. The 
United States botched the messaging to the Muslim world after killing Osama 
bin Laden. To the audience in the United States there was a low cost 
propaganda release of video of bin Laden sitting on the floor watching a small 
TV aimed at demonstrating what a miserable and pathetic fellow the man was. 
But to would-be jihadis, the actual effect was the opposite. They saw a leader 
living in humble conditions—a positive image under Muslim law. It was a low 
cost, culturally blind signal sent by the United States that was filtered and 
amplified though Islamic culture and tradition into a demonstration of the 
ultimate high-cost sacrifice of the man for his people.  
 The lesson is clear: be sure you know who your audience is before signaling 
and realize that the same message can be interpreted quite differently by 
different audiences. A low-cost signal to one audience could illustrate high-cost 
behavior to another audience.  
 
Conclusions 
While humans, like every other organism, have a unique evolutionary history, 
the rules of evolution and natural selection act on us all. More work is needed 
to disentangle the logic of individual versus group selected mechanisms on 
policy, but identifying these rules will inevitably create more insights about 
successful strategic behavior. Importantly, nature’s rules are all around us just 
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Blumstein et al. look to evolutionary theory regarding signaling in animal 
species to try to draw out some general rules of thumb that they think might be 
useful for diplomats and politicians in matters of foreign policy. The rationale 
for the exercise is that “By capitalizing on solutions derived by evolution over 
3. 5 billion year of life of Earth, we may identify ideas that otherwise might not 
have been explored in a policy context potentially offering quick, novel and 
effective options to increase strategic and combat effectiveness. ”  
 None of the eight rules of thumb, however, are novel propositions or 
observations, and some—like the eighth, ‘it’s essential to know your 
audience’—are mainstays of international relations literatures and diplomatic 
folklore or commonsense. (Not to say such wisdom is always acted on!) The 
core idea in several of them is that signals will not reliably convey their 
message unless they are actions (or words) that would be more costly for a 
potential bluffer to take. This idea has been familiar in Economics and Political 
Science research for some time now, and in this specific formulation it derives 
not from evolutionary theory but from developments in information economics 
in the late 1960s and early 1970s.  
 There are indeed some significant parallels between the strategic problems 
facing animals competing over territory or mates and that between two states, 
or a state and non-state group, at odds over territory or public policy. In both 
cases violent conflict is typically costly and thus something both sides would 
like to avoid. But both sides would also prefer that the other side concede more 
of whatever resources or goods (which might be symbolic, in the human case) 
are at stake. In both contexts, then, all can ideally be made better off if they can 
develop some kind of signaling system that allows the more motivated or 
strong types to credibly reveal this, so avoiding violent contests when a 
stronger or more motivated party faces a weaker or less motivated antagonist. 
It is fascinating—though perhaps not so surprising, once we have seen the 
analogy and realized that evolution can sometimes select ‘best reply’ strategies 
even without cognition—that animal contests (including sexual selection) often 
exhibit complex strategies of costly signaling.  
 What is less clear is whether there are specific findings from the study of 
signaling in (non-human) animal systems that have interesting or novel 
implications for diplomats and politicians engaged in international affairs. As 
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noted, none of these eight general rules of thumb are results or arguments that 
did not already emerge from social science studies of signaling in human 
contexts. Perhaps, however, as the study of signaling in animal contexts 
proceeds it will produce findings that suggest novel ideas about signaling in 
human contexts.  
 For example, the canonical story about the peacock’s tail has, according to 
more recent research, gotten somewhat murkier. There has always been the 
following theoretical objection: If a bigger tail with more eyespots signals 
greater quality, then greater fitness should select out variation in tails so that 
residual variation in tail quality is not correlated with fitness. Thus, in 
evolutionary equilibrium, expected fitness must be equal across larger and 
small tails, with the handicap of a larger train exactly compensating for a bird’s 
greater underlying quality.  
 Empirically, the original study found a correlation between number of 
eyespots and mating success in a population in Britain. However, more recent 
studies based on populations in France and Japan reached different 
conclusions. In the French group, number of eyespots was unrelated to mating 
success, but the length of the train was. In the Japanese birds, there was no 
correlation for either one. In studies of three different North American 
populations there was also no correlation between number of eyespots and 
mating success (at least until almost the bird’s eyespots were clipped off).  
 It could be that some other feature of the tail is a signal of mate quality. 
According to Erol Akcay, an evolutionary biologist who is my source for this 
information, we just don’t know, and we also don’t have studies that directly 
test whether the peacock’s tail is a costly signal, since cost has not been 
measured and related to ‘quality. ’ Akcay (personal communication) thinks it is 
likely that peacock’s tail is a signal of some kind, since it is hard to see it 
evolving without having some adaptive value. But he thinks “what exactly it is 
a signal of and whether it is honest because it’s costly are open questions at 
this point. ” 
 So perhaps things are not so straightforward. This is surely also the case for 
diplomacy. For example, it is not uniformly true that “honest signals will be 
costly” (Lesson 1) or that (Lesson 4) “threats should be costly. ” At a minimum, 
these claims depend on a prior assumption that we are talking about a 
situation in which the signaler can have a strong incentive to misrepresent its 
preferences or type—to bluff—to the target. In some diplomatic contexts, 
‘cheap talk’ can be informative because the parties’ interests are sufficiently 
aligned that misrepresentation can be counterproductive. Or, it can be the case 
that in signaling between governments there are so many sources of publicly 
available information about what is going on that misrepresentation is not a 
big concern. Finally, when states are signaling over multiple dimensions of 
policy, which is often the case, cheap talk can be informative even when there 
are incentives to misrepresent.  
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 A final comment is that to the extent that we do put stock in these costly 
signaling claims as rules of thumb, they may actually argue against the notion 
that evolutionary (or economic) theory can increase diplomats’ tactical success 
in contests. The point of these arguments is that contests are like auctions in 
which the side that is genuinely more resolved or more capable is more likely 
to win. The advice “Make your signals of resolve (or reassurance, if seeking 
peace) costly!” only makes sense if you actually are that resolved or you are 
that willing to risk a disadvantage in order to get to peace. There is a parallel 
here with “Lesson 3: Unexpected signals may be more effective,” where the 
authors suggest that “individual citizens lining up to help others (as often 
occurs after natural disasters) are truly meaningful gestures. ” The advice 
“deliberately make your gestures of reconciliation spontaneous in order to 
make them effective!” is a bit of contradiction in terms.  
 Evolutionary theory regarding signaling in animal contests may yet produce 
novel and interesting insights into signaling in roughly parallel human 
contexts. Given the incredible complexity and diversity of animal signaling 
systems, I would expect that this could be the case. But I’m not sure if these 
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In this interesting paper, Blumstein et al. argue for a view of diplomacy based 
on credible commitments, honest signals, and the prevention of 
misunderstandings caused by cultural distance. They hope to enlighten 
politicians with lessons drawn from evolutionary biology (though one might 
note that credible commitment was explored by Clausewitz before Darwin, and 
costly signaling is found in Thomas Schelling before Amos Zahavi). This 
comment challenges two points made by their article.  
 First, I argue that misdirection, ambiguity and provocation are worthy tools 
in a politician’s toolbox. Yes, such strategies may lead to military escalation — 
but sometimes that is precisely the point. I shall illustrate this with the story of 
the Ems dispatch, one of the most famous episodes of diplomatic signaling. 
Second, I will argue that Blumstein et al. misuse the notion of costly signaling, 
Blumstein et al. : Peacock’s Tale. Cliodynamics (2012) Vol. 3, Iss. 1 
 202 
as used in economics and evolutionary biology (Zahavi, 1977). A costly signal 
in the strict sense is so costly to produce that the fact of producing it provides a 
credible information. Peacock’s tails and nuclear tests are costly signals sensu 
stricto. Threats, promises, symbolic gestures, and most other diplomatic 
moves are not costly in that sense. As a result, their informational value is 
different.  
 
The Ems dispatch 
In the summer of 1870, Chancellor Bismarck made a diplomatic move that 
would eventually make him the unifier of Germany and the victor of the 
Franco-Prussian war (Howard 2001). The move began when he encouraged a 
cousin of the King of Prussia to become candidate for the throne of Spain. A 
Hohenzollern in Madrid — that would mean an encirclement of France by 
friends of Prussia, a notoriously hostile power. Bismarck knew this. He knew 
this may cause violent reactions from the French, even a war in which Paris 
would play the part of the aggressor. Such a war would fit well into Bismarck’s 
plans for national unification.  
 Yet Napoleon III deftly defused the crisis. He uncovered Bismarck’s plan 
and managed to have the Hohenzollern claim to the Spanish throne 
withdrawn, with the agreement of the King of Prussia. A French agent went to 
Ems-Baden to seal the deal with the King. Bismarck, seeing his plan unraveling 
under his eyes, refused to be present at the meeting, and threatened to resign if 
the meeting took place. All in vain.  
 On the thirteenth of July, on the promenade of Ems, the King had a tense 
but courteous talk with the French ambassador. He confirmed the withdrawal 
of the Hohenzollern candidacy. Unbeknownst to Napoleon III, the French 
secretary of State had ordered the ambassador to take a hard line. The 
ambassador tried to push his advantage and obtain a commitment for the 
future. The King politely declined, and telegraphed Bismarck that the incident 
was over. The Chancellor did not react. He was nowhere to be found.  
 Bismarck was busy exploiting a mistake in the ambassador’s strategy. The 
King had satisfied one French request, but not the other. Bismarck cut and 
rephrased the King’s telegram to showcase the King’s refusal. His version of 
the Ems telegram, sent to major French and German newspapers, depicts a 
harsh and bitter encounter. Nationalists on both sides further distorted the 
message. The dispatch humiliated Prussia, whose King had been harassed with 
an arrogant ultimatum. It incensed the French, who declared war on Prussia 
less than a week later. Bismarck had won his first move.  
 The Chancellor’s tactics may interest Daniel Blumstein and his coauthors, 
since it turns most of their advice on its head. Bismarck did not pay attention 
to Blumstein et al. ’s lessons 1 and 4. He produced few signals, most of them 
deceptive. He did not intend to resign if the Ems meeting took place. The Ems 
dispatch itself was a deliberately distorted signal.  
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 Oblivious to Blumstein et al. ’s lessons 2 and 3, Bismarck used historical 
precedent in a predictable, almost boring way. Unifying German imperial 
powers with the Spanish throne had been a classic geostrategic move in 
European history since the time of Charles V. It had always been interpreted as 
an attempt to isolate France, and Bismarck used this common knowledge to 
provoke the French.  
 Against lesson 8, Bismarck knew that the Ems dispatch would give rise to 
divergent interpretations on both sides of the Rhine, with everyone distorting 
and amplifying the dispatch to suit their purposes (as he himself did). Yet he 
did not try to limit or control the disagreements, as he did not see them as 
obstacles. Quite the contrary.  
 
‘Costly’ signals? 
Yet, one might reply, Bismarck seems to follow at least one of Blumstein et al. 
’s lessons. In a way, he uses ‘costly’ signals: every time he communicates 
something, he takes a risk. His foreign policy is like the peacock’s tail in this 
respect: it is a signal with a cost.  
 The analogy is misleading, though. The costly signals of modern costly 
signaling theory are not merely signals that have a cost to the producer. The 
point of costly signals is that certain signals are more reliable than others since 
their production is costly (Veblen 1899/1973, Schelling 1960, Zahavi 1977). For 
instance, a peacock’s tail is a reliable indicator of a peacock’s fitness because it 
would be hard to grow a beautiful tail without a good immune system. Or 
possessing two luxury cars is a reliable indicator of wealth because possessing 
such cars without being wealthy would be difficult. Those signals are especially 
reliable because they reveal a cost that has already been paid.  
 Compare those costly-to-produce signals with signals that are cheap to 
produce, though the emitters take risks when emitting them. Uttering a 
sentence, in itself, is easy, whether the sentence is true or not. Lying may have 
costly consequences, of course, but those costs lie in the future. However near 
that future might be, the costs are not paid by the liar when he pronounces his 
lie. Thus the production of a sentence, by itself, says nothing about its truth. In 
contrast, the mere fact of producing a beautiful tail is a good indicator of the 
reproductive potential that the tail indicates.  
 Blumstein et al. are right to note that politicians sometimes use such 
signals, like military parades or nuclear tests. But most diplomatic threats and 
promises are not costly signals in the biological sense. They are not costly and 
honest in the way a peacock’s tail is costly and honest. Bismarck’s threat to 
resign if the Ems meeting took place was just cheap words. His utterance of the 
threat was not an honest signal of his intention to resign. Indeed, nothing 
Bismarck could have said could be a costly signal in the biological sense.  
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Technical or moral advice? 
Bismarck’s warmongering was, of course, objectionable in many ways. A moral 
person would usually prefer diplomatic strategies based on credible 
commitment, and a careful avoidance of escalation and misunderstandings. 
Since the Cold War, this way of doing politics seems the least destructive on 
the global scale. Yet individual politicians do not necessarily have peace and 
security as their first objective. Credible commitment is a useful tool for them, 
but sometimes ambiguity and deception serve them better. Even for peace-
making: Charles de Gaulle solved the Algerian crisis by appearing utterly 
uncommitted and unpredictable. Thus, while I share the moral outlook of 
Blumstein et al. and agree with them on ethical grounds, I do not think we 
should commend their strategic solutions to actual politicians — unless we 
make it clear that we are not giving technical advice to diplomats, but 
promoting one particular view of what international relations should look like.  
References 
Michael Howard, 2001. The Franco-Prussian War: The German Invasion of 
France 1870-1871. Oxford: Routledge.  
Thomas Schelling, 1960. The Strategy of Conflict. Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press.  
Thorstein Veblen, 1899/1973. The Theory of the Leisure Class. Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin.  
Amos Zahavi, 1977. The cost of honesty (Further remarks on the handicap 







London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine  
e-mail: rebecca.sear@lshtm.ac.uk  
 
The application of evolutionary theory to the real world has the potential to be 
one of the most exciting developments in the human evolutionary behavioral 
sciences. Most research over the last few decades using an evolutionary 
framework to understand human behavior has been largely of theoretical 
interest, so to see researchers actively engage with how this research can be 
applied in settings such as international politics is an important step forward.  
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 While I am an enthusiastic supporter of such attempts, a question which 
interests me, and which is not dealt with in this particular article, is how to put 
these academic ideas into practice. The authors list 8 lessons that politicians 
can learn from evolutionary theory which will help them send and interpret 
signals in both diplomacy and war. But how does one get the actors involved in 
international politics to learn these lessons? The majority of such individuals 
are unlikely to have much training in evolutionary theory, or any other kind of 
science for that matter. No member of the British Cabinet, for example, has a 
science degree, and only one member of the House of Commons is apparently 
educated to PhD level in science. So it seems that researchers interested in 
persuading politicians that the insights of evolutionary theory may be of use to 
them need to get involved in lobbying and actively engaging with the political 
community, to bring this research to their attention. Generating greater 
interdisciplinary links within academia, and getting evolutionary ideas onto 
the syllabi of social science and humanities degrees would also help lay the 
groundwork, as the social sciences and humanities tend to be the educational 
route most UK politicians, at least, take (but see Mesoudi et al 2010 for a 
discussion of the challenges involved in this endeavor). A solid grounding in 
science and evolutionary theory during school-level education would also be a 
very good start, though possibly even more challenging.  
 To lobby and engage successfully with politicians, I’d also suggest 
researchers need to consider carefully exactly how their research may be 
applied in the real world. I suspect what may hold some evolutionary 
behavioral scientists back from doing so is a lack of understanding of how the 
theory-driven, hypothesis-testing research they do can be usefully applied to 
real world settings (at least, this is a significant reason for my own reluctance 
to engage substantially with policy-makers). The authors of this article have 
done just that by including examples of how past political events can be 
interpreted through the lens of evolutionary theory. What might be even more 
useful is to consider how evolution can be applied to developing future policy. 
This necessarily involves considerable dialogue with politicians and policy-
makers. Applied work is clearly becoming an active area of interest for the 
evolutionary community as suggested, for example, by the special issue of 
Human Nature on ‘The human behavioral ecology of contemporary world 
issues’ (Tucker, 2007); the recent book on Applied Evolutionary Psychology 
(Roberts 2011); and the recent workshop on Applied Evolutionary 
Anthropology held at the University of Bristol in September 2011.1 While these 
examples largely involve academics keen to apply their work, rather than 
policy-makers keen to apply it, Curtis and her colleagues at the London School 
of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine have been successful in promoting their 
                                                 
1 http://www. bris. ac. uk/arts/research/events/2011/641. html 
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‘Darwinian approach to health promotion’ in the real world (see e.g.Curtis, de 
Barra et al 2011; Curtis, Schmidt et al 2011); she helped found, for example, the 
Global Public-Private Partnership for Handwashing with Soap.2 
 Something else perhaps to consider, is how to convince politicians of the 
added value evolutionary theory can bring to the table. Certain sections of 
academia have had success in persuading politicians that their discipline can 
be used in the formulation of policy, for example, ‘nudge’ economics has been 
successfully promoted by behavioral economists (Thaler and Sunstein 2008). 
How might we convince politicians that the evolutionary behavioral sciences 
have anything to add to the voices of behavioral economists and psychologists 
working on human decision-making? One solution might be to combine 
evolutionary theory with disciplines more familiar to policy-makers: Tucker’s 
approach, for example of combining human behavioral ecology with behavioral 
economics to apply to conservation and development issues does just that 
(Tucker, 2007).  
 An important part of any endeavor applying academic research to the real 
world is likely to be the evaluation of policies which have been informed by 
such research. This may not be easy, since randomized control trials are clearly 
not possible in the field of international politics, but might it be possible to use 
‘natural experiments’ where policies known to have been influenced with 
evolutionary ideas could be compared to those who have not (though this of 
course assumes that it is possible to identify policies which have been informed 
by evolution, perhaps not easy to determine in itself)? 
 I welcome any endeavor which attempts to develop evolutionary research 
for application to real world human affairs, and would be very interested to 
hear more about the practicalities of such endeavors from those currently 
engaged in them: how is evolution being put into practice? 
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Students of international relations have applied signaling models to a variety 
of problems: decision to go to war (Morrow 1992), dispute resolution (Holler 
and Lindner 2004), foreign policy (Fearon 1997) and crisis bargaining (Tarar 
and Leventoglu 2008), to name a few. The eminent authors, Daniel T. 
Blumstein, Scott Atran, Scott Field, Michael E. Hochberg, Dominic D. P. 
Johnson, Raphael Sagarin, Richard Sosis, and Bradley Thayer, argue that 
studying signaling in nature reveals much about the underlying mechanisms of 
signaling in international politics. I remain skeptical: Humans use language 
purposively not only to formulate thoughts, but also thoughts about thoughts, 
knowingly distinguishing themselves from peacocks or deer. Consequently, 
signaling systems along with their associated behavior have emerged as 
outcomes of purposive interactions among human entities. For example, 
diplomatic behaviors such as trust building, deception and escalation have 
come about not as merely evolutionarily superior behaviors, but as products of 
groups of humans reflecting on their own and on one another’s thoughts that 
are assumed to represent, express, and reason about behaviors.  
 Do we find signaling systems with equally high-dimensional reflection in 
nature? I believe not. The degree of human cognitive capability and 
organizational machineries required for signaling in international politics 
render the evolutionary concepts in Blumstein et al. weak candidates for 
explaining international political behavior. For example, comparing escalation 
mechanisms among deer with the escalation ladder described by Kahn (1965) 
quickly turns into a futile exercise. Some evidence may point to ‘notional’ 
similarities between mechanisms of signaling in international politics and 
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those in nature. However, relying on such evidence to prescribe certain policies 
and specific behaviors is ill-advised.  
 Call me conventional, but I have a hard time believing that a negotiator 
must communicate honestly in order to be effective as dictated by the 
peacock’s tail. I also find it difficult to derive policy from signaling systems in 
nature that can answer questions such as when should states apologize, 
individuals commit suicide terrorism, and Al-Qaeda kill a hostage; at least at 
this stage of scientific inquiry. So lessons from evolution (for example for 
signaling) should be underpinned empirically and perhaps even 
experimentally if they are to evolve into more than a catch phrase for military-
industrial circles, as was ‘complexity’.  
 As an undergraduate student I was once rebuked by a professor for using a 
scene from an Asterix and Obelix comic book to illustrate cultural variation in 
the usage of time in the High Middle Ages. He thought it was a bad analogy 
because it lacked contextual correspondence. So what to take away from the 
article? That some evolutionary signaling mechanisms appear relevant for 
explaining signaling in international politics? That may be true. Yet, far more 
evidence should be brought to the fore to link signaling in nature with that in 
international politics empirically. Beginning with the differences between the 
two phenomena is perhaps a way forward.  
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Blumstein et al.: The Peacock’s Tale: New Ideas Require 
Quantitative Evaluation 
 
Speak softly and carry a big stick.  
—Theodore Roosevelt 
 
We were thrilled to receive four extremely thoughtful and constructively 
critical commentaries on our focus article. Apart from anything else, we are 
pleased to see that all respondents recognized the importance of strategic 
signaling in both nature and international politics, and the value of exploring 
their differences and similarities.  
 We especially appreciated Rebecca Sear’s goal to ask big picture questions 
about how one would overcome the obstacles of getting evolutionary insights 
out of the labs of biologists and into the laps of policymakers. As with the 
growing field of evolutionary medicine, we agree that an evidence-based 
experimental approach will be the best way to identify and hone effective 
strategies—the proof of the utility of these ideas is in the pudding. Can they 
improve our predictions and success in international politics? 
 Armando Geller is concerned to point out that humans are a very complex 
species, but we disagree that this means there are no insights from successful 
strategies in other species. The key point is that 3. 5 billion years of life on 
Earth reveals recurrent behavioral, organizational and mathematical patterns 
that appear across contexts and species, and transcend cognitive 
sophistication. For example, although human brains are remarkably complex, 
the movement of crowds can be modeled with surprisingly simple rules.  
 Humans are clever, but this hardly makes us immune to fundamental 
principles of nature. Almost every line drawn in the sand between humans and 
non-humans—tool use, language, deliberate planning for the future, sense of 
self—has dissolved with further examination of the animal world, or the 
realization that basic mechanisms of interaction trump cognition. We are 
different, but not as different as we’d like to believe. The advantage of 
analogies in natural history is in part through the sheer diversity of biology—
ideas generalized from biology have been tested in all sorts of environments by 
all sorts of organisms. As with all generalized analogies, exceptions can be 
found and contingencies must be considered, but this same argument could be 
applied to generalized theories of international relationships that contain no 
evolutionary or biological guidance.  
Blumstein et al. : Peacock’s Tale. Cliodynamics (2012) Vol. 3, Iss. 1 
 210 
 Geller is correct that human cognition adds a complicating dimension in 
applying signaling theory to human behavior, but cognitive capacity does not 
nullify the predictions of signaling models. Evolutionary models (e.g., ESS 
models, optimal foraging theory, life history theory) offer predictions about 
phenotypic strategies that often ignore the underlying mechanisms, including 
cognition, physiology, and even genetics, that produce these strategies, as long 
as these proximate mechanisms do not significantly constrain optimal 
outcomes. These models allow us to determine the selective pressures that 
favor successful strategies. While human cognition may enable humans to 
devise uniquely sophisticated signaling strategies, there is no reason to believe 
that human signals are somehow outside the reach of selection pressures.  
 From the opposite perspective, the critique that past theories of 
international relationships and politics have essentially come to similar 
conclusions as some of our evolutionarily inspired insights (as noted by 
Fearon) is not troubling to us—rather, it goes to support our claim that there 
are fundamental patterns that know no species boundaries. The tragedy is that 
different disciplines are reinventing the wheel. Biologists observe numerous 
examples of ‘convergent evolution’ where very similar structures or behaviors 
arose through very different evolutionary pathways. Where our suppositions 
align with those resulting from separate intellectual thought processes would 
seem to strengthen their conclusions, not weaken them. Nonetheless, we 
would argue that a biologically-based theory has the distinct advantage of a 
large empirical database populated by the diversity of life, and thus knowledge 
of how such systems vary across a wide variety of contexts, and its use of 
signaling and communication to survive for billions of years in hostile and 
unpredictable environments.  
 Note also that, crucially, signaling mechanisms may arise from a variety of 
selection mechanisms. Humans are different from deer, and one such 
difference is that we can observe and copy successful strategies (of, say, 
signaling). However, this process of selection and replication is just another 
evolutionary process—cultural evolution instead of genetic evolution. The 
consequence? Equilibria are the same (all else being equal), but evolution is 
faster. Geller writes that “signaling systems … have emerged as outcomes of 
purposive interactions among human entities”. This is certainly the case, but 
(1) those outcomes are influenced by evolved psychology (which may include 
the products of genetic evolution of signaling mechanisms).  
 Focusing on the differences between human and non-human signaling 
systems, as Geller advises, is indeed an important part of our analysis. 
However, the beauty of evolutionary biology is it gives us a framework against 
which to compare when and what our one species does differently from the 
millions of others.  
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 Olivier Morin offers a fascinating example of lying working in the interests 
of the state. However, there are two very important problems with using this 
example as a weapon against the importance of costly signaling.  
 First, we know from evolutionary game theory that cheaters can (and often 
will) exist at a low frequency—an example of frequency dependent selection. 
Indeed, models show that costly signaling, specifically, can remain perfectly 
stable in the presence of cheats who do not emit costly signals (Johnstone 
1997; Searcy & Nowicki 2005). Thus, a Bismarck or two does nothing to upset 
the fact that costly signaling prevails among the majority.  
 Second, this one example (about Bismarck), compelling as it is, worked 
precisely because other actors expected honesty. Indeed, diplomatic history is 
marked more by stringent etiquette than the violations that undermine them. 
More striking than cases like this are the widespread rules to which they are 
exceptions. Those widespread rules of the game are, among other things, 
honest signals: they persist even if they are sometimes breached. We agree 
with Morin that signalers may benefit by manipulating information. But this is 
only possible where honest signaling is the norm. There has to be an 
expectation for cheats to exploit it. As Teddy Roosevelt would advise us, if you 
carry a big stick, most of the time you do not have to shout.  
 It may also be worth noting that such cheats do not always succeed as 
Bismarck did. During the Vietnam war, Nixon came up with what he called the 
‘mad man’ strategy (Sagan & Suri 2003), in which he tried to convince Ho Chi 
Minh that he was crazy enough to consider the use of nuclear weapons against 
North Vietnam if negotiations failed. If Ho believed it, the war could be ended 
early. However, Nixon failed to convince Ho that this was the case. Deceptive 
signals do not always work.  
 Morin raised an excellent point when he noted that cost implies reliability 
and it works by indicating past, rather than future investment. While, as the 
saying goes, “past returns do not predict future performance”, this is valuable 
information in a Bayesian context and permits one to modify actions 
accordingly. We would argue, especially in our information-dense age that 
‘merely’ stating a position does indeed carry enormous immediate costs. Just 
consider how quickly simple, often symbolic gestures—President Obama 
apologizing to Afghanistan for U. S. troops burning Korans or Rush Limbaugh 
calling a birth-control advocate a ‘slut’—result in political and economic 
repercussions. In fact, in political observation, it is often seen as a sign of a 
strong leader that they are able to ‘speak their mind’ and by contrast, one who 
is seen as continually parsing their words to ‘feel the political winds’ is usually 
considered to be in a position of weakness. Building up a body of strong 
statements and yet maintaining a leadership position is certainly perceived as 
both a signal of past and current strength.  
 Finally, we contest the idea that “most diplomatic threats and promises are 
not costly signals in the biological sense [i.e., signals that are costly to 
Blumstein et al. : Peacock’s Tale. Cliodynamics (2012) Vol. 3, Iss. 1 
 212 
produce]”. Indeed, it is also important to recognize that not all signals require 
significant costs to ensure reliability. For example, conventional signals, such 
as symbolic gestures, can be reliable, if dishonest signalers experience 
differential benefits. More promising for political signaling are models that 
demonstrate the importance of future interactions for maintaining low-cost 
reliable signals. In a study on rhesus macaques, for example, Silk et al. (2000) 
show that low-cost vocal signals, what the authors refer to as ‘cheap talk’, can 
be honest and stabilize even when interests conflict, as long as there is a high 
expectation of future interaction. These conditions would seem to parallel the 
reality of many political interactions; the likelihood of future interactions are 
particularly high, since governments and nations usually survive beyond the 
lives of their leaders.  
 Whether states follow through on their threats or commitments is laid bare 
for all to see in the pages of history, so there are reputational (and domestic 
political) costs to making claims that are unrealistic or unbelievable. But 
furthermore, threats and commitments very often require massive costs, in 
shoring up political capital to make them, binding alliance treaties, and 
military deployments. The United States only signaled that it was serious about 
invading Iraq in 1991 when there were half a million troops on the ground.  
 The importance of information in strategic signaling and negotiation was 
also recognized by James Fearon; a political scientist who has thought deeply 
about these ideas for a number years and has incorporated perspectives from 
other disciplines. His main point is that our predictions are not surprising 
because they have already been arrived at in political science and economics 
only means that there are fundamental patterns that transcend species and 
context. In the context of international relations, these same successful 
strategies may in fact have arisen precisely because they have been shaped by a 
process of (cultural) evolution. Our essay attempts to explain why and how 
those effective strategies were selected.  
 Fearon also notes that signals vary widely in international relations as well 
as in biology. Biological insights may be useful for this reason alone: the 
plethora of examples of signaling in nature allow us to generate predictions for 
what kind of signals are likely to emerge (and be successful) in a variety of 
different contexts. The key parameters are probably much more varied in 
nature than they are in politics.  
 Fearon might be more persuaded by the utility of evolution in its novel 
predictions for understanding of when and where signaling may succeed or 
fail. Although above we have stressed the system-level, that is, some selection 
mechanism generating costly signaling among interacting entities, costly 
signaling is thought to have been an important part of human cognitive 
evolution as well. If so, humans may be predisposed to making costly signals of 
commitment when interacting with other humans (including other state 
leaders). Thus, states may not need to wait for a process of socialization to 
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generate signals: state leaders will do it anyway. This can be a useful insight, 
because the proximate mechanisms that cause costly signaling have not 
changed from the Pleistocene to today, but the social and technological context 
has changed beyond recognition. This means that an understanding of the 
evolution of signaling mechanisms can generate predictions for ‘evolutionary 
mismatch’—the contexts in which our proximate mechanisms for signaling will 
be triggered but lead to detrimental outcomes in the modern world.  
 Fearon may be right to note that ‘rules of thumb’ are unlikely to lead to the 
optimal exploitation of signals in international politics. This is because rules of 
thumb work on average, over time, but make many individual errors along the 
way. Because humans are clever, they should in principle be able to work out 
what to do on a case-by-case basis rather than having a blanket strategy that 
works well on the whole but often makes mistakes (perhaps causing wars or 
disasters in the process). But this does not make the stable strategy less 
important to understand. In fact, it makes it more important to understand, 
because only by understanding the likely strategies of other states can we 
determine when to play by the rules or to seize the opportunity to bluff and win 
cheaply.  
 Lastly (he made so many important points!), we can defend his penultimate 
criticism of our suggestion to “deliberately make your gestures of 
reconciliation spontaneous in order to make them effective”. As he says, this 
may seem a contradiction—how can you plan something spontaneous? Again, 
evolution may be way ahead of us here. Robert Trivers’s new book suggests 
that humans have evolved not just deception, but self-deception, and this is an 
adaptive strategy to better deceive others (Trivers 2011). Deliberate deception 
can be ineffective because ‘behavioral leakage’ can give the game away. 
Genuinely believing you are confident of victory, or willing to reconcile, even if 
you are not, is more likely to bluff an adversary. Long ago, economist Robert 
Frank made related arguments about emotions being a strategic device to deter 
enemies. Rational choice cannot match it because it is too predictable. Nature 
discovered this many millions of years ago.  
 We end with an analogy that illustrates the conservative nature of 
integrating disparate disciplines. The field of evolutionary medicine could be 
said to have begun with the 1990 Quarterly Review of Biology article showing 
how and why the field of medicine would benefit from the incorporation of 
evolutionary thinking and knowledge. Twenty-two years on, there are 
textbooks, edited volumes, and studies showing how evolutionary ideas can 
enhance medicine and public health, yet in the US there are no evolutionary 
medicine degrees, physicians are not trained in evolution, and most medical 
schools have no evolutionary biologists on their faculty (R. Nesse, pers. 
comm.). Indeed, many of the recommendations are high-level suggestions for 
future study. While there have been a number of ‘actionable’ discoveries, 
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evolutionary medicine sets the stage for proper empirical studies; all of which 
must be tested before application.  
 We believe that nature has similar insights for political science and that 
when questions can be focused to be more actionable, they can be studied and 
their successes and failures evaluated. Just like a doctor wouldn’t want to use 
evolutionary logic alone without a double-blind study to determine treatment 
strategies, diplomats and negotiators might not want to immediately jump in 
and adopt our suggestions. However, those that take lessons from life and 
study their effectiveness might find that 3. 5 billion years of life has created 
effective time-tested strategies (Sagarin & Taylor 2008; Sagarin et al. 2010). It 
is a short step to investigate whether these work today as well.  
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